LANDLORD

AND

TENANT-MORTGAGES-NEW
JERSEY'S
N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:18-61.1 TO -61.12
CUM. Supp. 1980-1981), PROHIBITS REMOVAL OF RESI-

ANTI-EVICTION
(WEST

ACT,

DENTIAL TENANTS

BY FORECLOSING MORTGAGEE

FAULT OF LANDLORD-MORTGAGOR,

ABSENT

UPON DE-

"GOOD CAUSE"-

Guttenberg Savings & Loan Association v. Rivera, 171 N.J.
Super. 418, 409 A.2d 816 (App. Div. 1979), certif, granted, 84
N.J. 417, 420 A.2d 331 (1980).
In Guttenberg Savings & Loan Association v. Rivera,1 the bank
held a mortgage on an eight-unit apartment building in Jersey City.
After the mortgagor defaulted on payment, the bank filed a complaint
in foreclosure seeking to preclude redemption and to obtain a judgment of possession against the tenants. 2 The tenants3 moved to dismiss the complaint against them ,4 contending that New Jersey's
Anti-Eviction Act 5 barred a judgment of possession against residential
tenants absent a showing of statutory "good cause." The savings and
loan association responded that the Act did not apply because no
landlord-tenant relationship existed between the mortgagee and the
mortgagor's tenants "since there ha[d] been no attornment by the
tenants to plaintiff."6
On January 9, 1979, Judge Kentz of the chancery division denied
the tenants' motion to dismiss.'
In a brief, written opinion the trial
judge refused to allow the use of the Anti-Eviction Act in any proceeding except a summary dispossess action. 8 The tenants appealed

1 165 N.J. Super. 201, 397 A.2d 1127 (Ch. Div.), rev'd, 171 N.J. Super. 418, 409 A.2d 816
(App. Div. 1979), certif, granted, 84 N.J. 417, 420 A.2d 331 (1980).
2 171 N.J. Super. at 419, 409 A.2d at 817. The debt owed by the mortgagor was approximatelv $30,000.00. This was a first mortgage on the apartment house, which was located at 510
Palisade Avenue. Id.
' There were five tenants named in the action: Norma Rivera, Olga M1lujer, Goen Rodriguez, Elizabeth Kalisak, and Richard Dressier, all of whom were month-to-month tenants. 165
N.J. Super. at 201, 397 A.2d at 1127.
4 The motion was based upon a failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted,
as provided for by N.J. Ct. R. 4:6-2 (e).
5 N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:18-61.1 to -61.12 (West Cui. Supp. 1980-1981). This statute is
also known as the For-Cause Eviction Act or the No Cause-No Eviction Act.
6 165 N.J. Super. at 202, 397 A.2d at 1128. Attornment is "an act bv which a tenant
acknowledges his obligation to a new landlord." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 119 (5th ed. 1979).
See Del-News Co. v. James, 111 N.J.L. 157, 167 A. 247 (Sup. Ct. 1933).
7 165 NJ. Super. at 204, 397 A.2d at 1128.
8 165 N.J. Super. at 203, 397 A.2d at 1128. The tenants failed to bring to the court's
attention any authority holding the Act applicable to actions other than summary dispossession.
Id. The court was therefore "unwilling to expand the applicability" of the Act sua sponte. Id.
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the ruling that the Anti-Eviction Act was not applicable to a mortgage
foreclosure proceeding, and the appellate division reversed. 9 Writing for a unanimous panel, Judge King held that the Anti-Eviction
Act was applicable to this type of proceeding and, absent good cause
as provided in the statute, any removal of tenants was prohibited. 10
This clash between the rights of a foreclosing mortgagee and the protection afforded tenants by the Anti-Eviction Act is an issue of first
impression in this state, and its resolution is replete with far-reaching
ramifications.
On June 25, 1974, the Anti-Eviction Act became law in New
Jersey. 1 The statute's enactment effectuated a change in the legal
relationship of landlords and certain residential tenants. 12 Statutory
rights and remedies, as well as those afforded by the common law,
9 171 N.J. Super. at 423, 409 A.2d at 819. Following the lower court's denial of the tenants' motion to dismiss, both parties filed various motions: plaintiff moved to strike the tenants'
answer; tenants moved for summary judgment, or in the alternative for a stay of the issuance of
the writ of possession. On February 9, 1979, the court entered a summary judgment for the
bank, denied the requested stay, and entered a final judgment of foreclosure on March 30. This
was followed, on April 16, by the tenants' filing an appeal and notice of lispendens. On the
same day, the tenants sought a stay of the execution sale, which stay was denied. On July 10,
1979, however, the lower court ordered a stay of the judgment awarding possession to the bank,
pending the appeal. Id. at 420-21, 409 A.2d at 817-18.
10 Id. at 419, 409 A.2d at 819. Before addressing the primary issue of tenants and their
rights vis-a-vis foreclosing mortgagees, however, the court was faced with a claim that the issue
was moot, in that all the tenants had vacated the premises pursuant to an order of the Director
of Property Conservation of Jersey City condemning the building. As explained by counsel for
the tenants, this condition was caused by the "abandonment of the premises [by the mortgagor]
following default," which led to "a state of disrepair resulting in the municipal order to vacate."
Id. at 420, 409 A.2d at 817. Relying upon those representations, as well as affidavits filed by the
tenants, the appellate court held that "the tenants continuing desire to move back into the
premises sufficiently quicken[ed] the controversy to avoid the claim of mootness." Id. at 421,
409 A.2d at 818.
11 Introduced in the Assembly on April 16, 1974 by Assemblyman Baer and numerous
others, the Anti-Eviction Act was entitled: "AN ACT establishing grounds for evicting tenants
and lessees of certain residential property, amending N.J.S.A. 2A:18-53 and repealing section 1
of P.L. 1973, c. 153 (C.46:8C-1)." 1974 N.J. Laws, Ch. 49. Attached to the Act, but neither
part of the codification of Assembly Bill 1586, nor contained in LAWS OF NEW JERSEY 1974, was
the following statement:
At present there are no limitations imposed by statute upon the reasons a landlord may utilize to evict a tenant. As a result, residential tenants frequently have
been unfairly and arbitrarily ousted from housing quarters in which they have been
comfortable and where they have not caused any problems. This is a serious matter,
particularly now that there is a critical shortage of rental housing space in New
Jersey. This act shall limit the eviction of tenants by landlords to reasonable
grounds and provide that suitable notice shall be given to tenants when an action
for eviction is instituted by the landlord.
N.J. Ass. Bill 1586 (1974) (attached statement).
12 The Act is inapplicable to "owner-occupied premises with not more than two rental units
or a hotel, motel, or other guest house or part thereof rented to a transient guest or seasonal
tenant." N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.1 (West Cum. Supp. 1980-1981).
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were affected by the adoption of this remedial legislation. 13 Recognizing a critical housing shortage in the state, the New Jersey legislature promulgated this statute to impose limitations "upon the reasons
a landlord may utilize to evict a tenant." 14
At common law, a landlord was entitled to possession of the demised premises upon the expiration of the lease. A tenant who remained in possession after expiration was viewed as a tenant-atsufferance, that is, "one who comes into possession of land by lawful
title, but keeps it afterwards without any title at all." 15 The common
law landlord was limited to two remedies in such a situation: he could
enter the premises vi et armis, or he could prove superior title in an
ejectment action. 16 The former, a self-help remedy, resulted in legal
condonation of breaches of the peace; as a result, forcible entry and
detainer statutes were enacted to protect a person in peaceful possession of property. The latter, a civil action brought in the law courts,
determines who has the exclusive right to possession of property. The
trial-type procedure followed in that action is unduly lengthy, 17 resulting in continuous pecuniary detriment to the landlord.
The legislative response to the perceived need for a swift method
of removing a tenant-at-sufferance was the widespread creation of an
abbreviated procedure through the summary dispossess statutes. Such
laws generally provided for an expedited judicial determination of
who is entitled to possession as between the landlord and tenant.' 8 In
New Jersey, summary dispossession was viewed as a procedural
mechanism which aided in the enforcement of substantive rights, not
as a grant of such rights.19 The statute in New Jersey, moreover,

"zSee

25 Fairmont Ave., Inc. v. Stockton, 130 N.J. Super. 276, 326 A.2d 106 (Dist. Ct.

Bergen Cty. 1974); note 31 infra.
14 N.J. Ass. Bill 1586 (1974) (attached statement). See note 11 supra.
15 2 W.
16 Id.

BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES

150.

See 3A G. THOMPSON, REAL PROPERTY § 1369 (repl. ed. 1961) for a discIssion of

these common law remedies and their application.
17 See 3A G. THOMPSON, supra note 16, at § 1369.
18 In New Jersey, the summary dispossess statute is N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:18-53 to -61

(West 1952). As stated in Vineland Shopping Center, Inc. v. DeMarco, 35 N.J. 459, 173 A.2d
270 (1961):
The purpose was to
The summary dispossess statute originated in 1847 ....
give the landlord a quick remedy for possession. Appellate review was barred, thus

giving finality to the trial court's judgment with respect to possession. The tenant
was remitted to an action for damages in which the judgment in the possessory
action had no binding effect upon the ultimate merits of the case.
Id. at 462, 173 A.2d at 272.
19 See Manahan v. City of Englewood, 108 N.J.L. 249, 157 A. 241 (Sup. Ct. 1931); Jonas
Glass Co. v. Ross, 69 N.J.L. 157, 53 A. 675 (Sup. Ct. 1902). The Anti-Eviction Act-an
amendment to New Jersey's summary dispossess statute-has, however, been construed to

alter substantive property rights. See note 31 infra.
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was codified as part of the jurisdictional grant to the county district
courts. 20 This grant was "procedural" by its terms. In the past, the
landlord's substantive property rights had emanated either from stat21
utes other than summary dispossession or from the common law.
In 1974, however, with the emergence of a statewide critical
housing shortage, this limited view of summary dispossession in New
Jersey was radically altered by the enactment of the Anti-Eviction
Act. 22 The courts, in interpreting this Act, have stated that once an
owner of property conveys a leasehold interest the owner has lost his
right to possession; this right can be regained only if "the tenant is
guilty of some act or omission which constitutes 'good cause' or [ifl
• . .the property is to be removed from the rental market." 23 Such
interpretations have prompted landlords to challenge the Act as a taking of property without compensation, but the Act's constitutionality
has been upheld insofar as it applies to the landlord-tenant relationship. 2 4 Whether the Act is properly applicable to other relationships
requires a review of its terms and its interpretative case law.
The Anti-Eviction Act states that no tenant "may be removed by
the county district court or the Superior Court" from premises leased
for residential purposes unless good cause is established. Exempted
from the enactment are "owner-occupied premises with not more
than two rental units or a hotel, motel or other guest house or part
thereof rented to a transient guest or seasonal tenant." 25 Thirteen
subsections that follow enumerate eighteen separate grounds which
constitute good cause. 26 In another section a landlord is prohibited
from refusing to renew a lease without a section 2 good cause. 27
20 N.J. STAT. ANN.

§§ 2A:18-1 to -71 (West 1952).

21 25 Fairmont Ave., Inc. v. Stockton, 130 N.J. Super. 276, 281, 326 A.2d. 106, 109 (Dist.
Ct. Bergen Cty. 1974). See Jonas Glass Co. v. Ross, 69 N.J.L. 157, 53 A. 675 (Sup. Ct. 1902).
22 Stamboulos v. McKee, 134 N.J. Super. 567, 342 A.2d 529 (App. Div. 1975); 25 Fairmont
Ave., Inc. v. Stockton, 130 N.J. Super. 276, 326 A.2d 106 (Dist. Ct. Bergen Cty. 1974).
23 25 Fairmont Ave., Inc. v. Stockton, 130 N.J. Super. 276, 283-84, 326 A.2d 106, 111
(Dist. Ct. Bergen Ctv. 1974).
24 See Puttrich v. Smith, 170 N.J. Super. 572, 407 A.2d 842 (App. Div. 1979); Stamboulos

v. McKee, 134 N.J. Super. 567, 342 A.2d 529 (App. Div. 1975).
25 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.1 (West Cum. Supp. 1980-1981).
26 Id. These causes are of two basic types; acts of the landlord/owner and acts of the tenant.

Id.
27 That section provides:
No landlord may evict or fail to renew any lease of any premises covered by

section 2 of this act except for good cause as defined in section 2.
N.J. STAT. ANN § 2A:18-61.3 (West Cur. Supp. 1980-1981). Further, the act prohibits tenant
waiver of rights by stating:
[a]ny provision in a lease whereby any tenant covered by section 2 of this act

agrees that his tenancy may be terminated or not renewed for other than good
cause as defined in section 2, or whereby the tenant waives any other rights under

this act shall be deemed against public policy and unenforceable.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.4 (West Cum. Supp. 1980-1981).
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Hence the statute, read literally, effectuates the legislature's purpose
of preventing arbitrary and capricious evictions by landlords. The issue, therefore, is whether the statute should be read literally to forbid any court from ever removing a tenant absent a showing of the
requisite good cause.
Good cause is described in the statute by reference to specific
situations. Generally, if a tenant does not pay rent or engages in disorderly or destructive activities that tenant's landlord may seek his
removal via summary dispossession. 2 A tenant may also be removed, in limited circumstances, where the landlord seeks to exercise his "ultimate" property right, that of removing the property from
the housing market. 29 Severe penalties are imposed on a landlord
30
who fabricates a claim of good cause.
When first enacted, however, the Anti-Eviction Act did not contain many of the good causes associated with the landlord's exercise of
his property rights. Therefore, the initial interpretive cases concerned
the statute's constitutionality and breadth. 3 1 In Stamboulos v.

28 A tenant may be removed from the leasehold if that person: "Fails to pay rent due and

owing," N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.1 (a) (West Cum. Supp. 1980-1981); "destroy[s] the peace,
and quiet" of the building or neighborhood, id. at (b); damages the premises wilfully or through
gross negligence, id. at (c); violates the reasonable rules and regulations of the landlord, id. at
(d); breaches any lease covenant, id. at (e); fails to pay a reasonable rent increase, id. at (f); or,
habitually fails to pay rent "which is due and owing," id. at (j).
29 Good cause to evict exists where the landlord or owner: wishes "to permanently board up
or demolish the premises," because of health and safety violations, where elimination of such
violations would be "economically unfeasible," N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.1(g)(1) (West Cum.
Supp. 1980-1981); attempts to comply with housing inspector directives, and compliance is "unfeasible" absent tenant removal, id. at (g)(2 ); "seeks to correct an illegal occupancy," subject to
the same "unfeasible" standard, id. at (g)(3); "is a governmental agency [wishing] to permanently
retire the premises" in pursuit of a blighted-area redevelopment plan, id. at (g)(4 ); desires to
permanently retire the building from the residential market, id.at (h); proposes reasonable
changes in the terms of the lease at its end, via a written notice, which the tenant refuses to
accept, id. at (i); is converting to a condominium or cooperative, id. at (k). is converting to or
constructing a condominium or cooperative, and the owner has contracted to sell the unit to a
purchaser who will personally occupy it, id. at (1)(1); seeks to personally occupy a unit of certain
condominiums or cooperatives "or has contracted to sell to a buyer seeking to personally occupy," id. at (1) (2); seeks, in a building containing three residential units or less, to personally
occupy the tenant's unit, or has contracted to sell to a purchaser so desiring, id.at (1)(3); or, has
conditioned the tenancy on the tenant's employment as superintendent or janitor, and such
employment has been terminated, id. at (m).
The notice provisions of the Act vary from no notice required for failure to pay rent, id. at
-61.2, to a three-year notice requirement when converting to a condominium or cooperative, id.
at -61.2(g).
30 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.6. The penalty is usually treble damages plus attorney's fees
and court costs. Id.
31 In 25 Fairmont Ave., Inc. v. Stockton, 130 N.J. Super. 276, 326 A.2d 106 (Dist. Ct.
Bergen Cty. 1974), a county district court was faced with the issue of whether the Anti-Eviction
Act affected merely the procedure involved in a summary dispossess action or went to the substantive rights of a party to a lease. In holding that the statute "change[d] . .. the substantive
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rights of landlords and tenants while also amending the jurisdictional and procedural requirements," id. at 283, 326 A.2d at 110, the court relied on a number of factors. Although it
recognized that the statute was subsumed under the District Court Act, basically a procedural
statute, the court felt the Act's title, "[an Act establishing grounds for evicting tenants and
lessees of certain residential property," sufficed to comply with the state constitutional mandate
that the title of an act must express its object. Id. at 284, 326 A.2d at 111. See N.J. CONST. art.
4, § 7, para. 4. The statute, in the opinion of the court, could therefore constitutionally change
landlord-tenant law, and not merely the procedures of the county district courts. The court,
moreover, made a distinction between a possessory right and a "right" to a summary proceeding, and noted that the latter is more akin to a privilege since it is a creature of the legislature.
130 N.J. Super. at 285, 326 A.2d at 111. The court implied that the legislature could repeal the
summary dispossess statute while not affecting the landlord's right to possession since ejectment
remained as a viable alternative. See id. at 285-86, 326 A.2d at 111-12. Citing the legislature's
recognition of a critical housing shortage, the court sought to carry out their intent to change
the "ancient rights of landlords" by limiting evictions to good cause. Id. at 287-88, 326 A.2d at
113.
Stockton was followed by the per curiain appellate division decision of Bradley v. Rapp,
132 N.J. Super. 429, 334 A.2d 61 (App. Div.), certif denied, 68 N.J. 149, 343 A.2d 437 (1975).
In that case tenants appealed a county district court decision wherein the landlord had been
awarded possession without establishing good cause. The landlord had recently purchased a
two-family home in West Orange and defendants were month-to-month tenants residing in one
unit. A summary dispossess action was instituted against them, and the trial judge held for the
landlord. 132 N.J. Super. at 431, 334 A.2d at 61-62. On appeal the decision was affirmed. The
court dismissed the tenant's argument that the landlord's failure to prove good cause prevented
tenant removal, and found that the "owner-occupied" exception applied to the facts presented.
In an application of."common sense" rather than "scholastic strictness," the court held that in
light of the fact that an owner residing in a two-family residence is exempt from the statute, a
new purchaser desirous of immediately residing in one unit of a two-family residence is likewise
statutorily exempt from the rigors of good cause. Id. at 433-34, 334 A.2d at 63.
In the wake of Bradley's expansion of "owner-occupied premises" came the decision in
Sabato v. Sabato, 135 N.J. Super. 158, 342 A.2d 886 (Law Div. 1975). As in Bradley, the case
involved purchasers of a house who wished to occupy one of the units and who brought a
summary dispossess proceeding against the tenant. Here, however, the premises in question
consisted of three units, clearly within the purview of the good cause provisions. Id. at 163, 342
A.2d at 888-89. The case was removed from county district court to the superior court, pursuant
to the landlord's constitutional challenge to the Anti-Eviction Act. See N.J. STAT. ANN. §
2A:18-60 (West 1952) (summary dispossess proceedings may be transferred from the county
district court to the superior court if the cause of action is "of sufficient'importance"). After a
review of the statute and the policy regarding judicial review of legislative enactments, the
court found the statute unconstitutional. Sabato v. Sabato, 135 N.J. Super. at 164-68, 175-77,
342 A.2d at 889-91, 895-97. It characterized the tenants' ability to remain in possession absent
good cause to evict as a "'novel right" which usurped the landlord's fee simple absolute interest
in violation of due process. Id. at 172, 175-76, 342 A.2d at 894, 895-96. The court criticized the
legislature for not balancing the means utilized to protect tenants from arbitrary ouster against
"basic rights of property ovners." Id. at 175, 342 A.2d at 896. It held that the statute's "net
effect is to unduly restrict the heretofore unrestrained transfer and use of such property, resulting in illegal confiscation without just compensation." Id. The court opined that its decision had
not "diminished to any appreciable degree" the legislative goal of protecting tenants from arbitrary, capricious, or unfair removal. Id. at 176, 342 A.2d at 896. In concluding, Judge Scalero
addressed comments to the legislature in two areas. First, he indicated a belief that the better
course would have been enactment of specific restrictions on eviction, rather than a "blanket
restraint" followed by numerous exceptions. Id. at 177, 342 A.2d at 897. In addition, the trial
judge suggested that the legislature amend the Anti-Eviction Act to allow the landlord to exercise his own personal right to possession at either specified times, or limit this right to certain
titleholders or certain types of property. Id. at 178, 342 A.2d at 897. These suggestions appear
not to have fallen on deaf ears; see note 37 infra and accompanying text. But see Puttrich v.
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McKee, 3 2 the court held that the Anti-Eviction Act did not violate an
owner's fundamental property rights. New purchasers of a four-unit
apartment building, intending to occupy one of the units in the building, brought a summary dispossess action against month-to-month
tenants who had resided there for approximately twenty-eight years.
In dismissing the purchaser's constitutional challenge as nonmeritorious, the court articulated the legislative intent underlying the
statute as found in a statement attached to the legislation, and took judicial notice of a statewide critical housing shortage. 33 The court, in upholding the Act's validity, stated that "[p]rivate property rights are always subject to the reasonable exercise of
the state's police power, where the protection of the health, safety
and general welfare of the people are concerned." 34 The court did,
however, question whether the failure of the initial 1974 enactment
to provide for an owner-occupation exception to the no-eviction rule
was a legislative oversight. While cognizant of possible unjust results
in the future, this court displayed reluctance to correct the situation
judicially. It viewed the appropriate remedy as being "amendatory
35
legislation" rather than "judicial relief."
In response to such suggestions from the judiciary, the legislature in 1976 passed substantial amendments to the rudimentary
enactment. These additions were addressed primarily to the owner's
possessory rights, 36 and in some respects served as a codification of
early interpretative case law. 37 Until the decision in Guttenberg,
Smith, 170 N.J. Super. 527, 407 A.2d 842 (App. Div. 1979) (partially overruling the Sabato
decision to the extent it conflicts with Stamboulos v. McKee, 134 N.J. Super. 567, 342 A.2d 529
(App. Div. 1975)).

32 134 N.J. Super. 567, 342 A.2d 529 (App. Div. 1975).
33 Id. at 569-73, 342 A.2d at 530-32.
34 Id. at 572, 342 A.2d at 532.
35 1d. at 573, 342 A.2d at 532. The court also dismissed an argument that the statute unconstitutionallv impaired the freedom of contract, under the same reasonable-exercise-of-policepower rationale. Id. at 575, 342 A.2d at 533.
" See note 29 supra.

37 For example, on July 16, 1975, thirty-three days after the decision came down in Sabato
v. Sabato, 135 N.J. Super. 158, 342 A.2d 886 (Law Div. 1975), the sponsors of the Anti-

Eviction Act introduced amendments to the Act. 1976 N.J. Laws, ch'. 311. One of the additions
to the good cause definition was N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.1(1)(3), which provides for good
cause where:
[tihe owner of a building of three residential units or less seeks to personally
occupy a unit, or has contracted to sell the residential unit to a buyer who wishes to
personally occupy it and the contract for sale calls for the unit to be vacant at the
time of closing.
Compare this provision with the facts of Sabato, see note 31 supra, and Judge Scalera's sugges-

tions to the legislature:
It may well be that the Legislature will deem it appropriate or desirable to
amend the act to require that a landlord's exercise of that right be invoked at cer-
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however, there was only one reported decision construing the Act that
did not originate as a summary dispossess action. 3 8 Moreover, the
opinion rendered in that case failed to address directly the AntiEviction Act's applicability beyond summary dispossession.
39
In Floral Park Tenants Association v. Project Holding, Inc.,
two causes of action had been consolidated in the chancery division to
determine the rights of tenants faced with a threat of removal. 40 Project Holding owned Floral Park Gardens, a three-hundred and
seventy-four unit apartment complex in North Bergen. Project Holding had received approval and financial commitments from the Department of Housing and Urban Development to rehabilitate its
buildings. To facilitate repairs, 41 Project Holding provided assistance
for its tenants to relocate temporarily. The tenants association, in opposing the relocation and return plan, argued for a literal reading of
the Anti-Eviction Act. Absent statutory good cause, it contended,
tenant removal was prohibited. 4 2 The court disagreed. After reviewtain times (e.g., within a reasonable time after purchase or upon expiration of the
term of an existing lease), or that it be limited to a certain class of.persons holding
title (e.g., individuals or their immediate family, or individual partners, as opposed
to corporate owners), or limited to certain types of property (e.g., buildings or
structures ordinarily utilized for owner occupancy as opposed to large apartment
houses or garden apartment complexes clearly representing "investment type" properties). Whether any particular limitation or set of restrictions thus imposed will
pass constitutional muster must, of necessity, await the presentation thereof to a
court of competent jurisdiction.
135 N.J. Super. at 178, 342 A.2d at 897 (emphasis added). It should also be noted that the New
Jersey Attorney General's Office appeared in Sabato as amnicus curiae.
38 Floral Park Tenants Ass'n v. Project Holding, Inc., 152 N.J. Super. 582, 378 A.2d 266
(Ch. Div. 1977), affd sub nom. Project Holding, Inc. v. Smyth, 166 N.J. Super. 354, 399 A.2d
1033 (App. Div. 1979) (per curiam). See notes 39-47 infra and accompanying text.
39 152 N.J. Super. 582, 378 A.2d 266 (Ch. Div. 1977), affd sub nom. Project Holding, Inc.
v. Smyth, 166 N.J. Super. 354, 399 A.2d 1033 (App. Div. 1979) (per curiam).
40 The landlord sought a declaratory judgment that its remaining tenants temporarily vacate
their apartments to facilitate renovations; the tenants brought an action to enjoin and restrain
their landlord from interfering with their possessory rights. Id. at 587, 378 A.2d at 269. The
court felt it was confronted with a public policy dilemma:
On the one hand, there exists the social legislation embodied in the AntiEviction Act aimed at protecting tenants and their right to housing against unreasonable and aibitrary eviction., On the other hand, there exists the public policy
underlying numerous state and federal statutes aimed at promoting and expediting
low and moderate-income housing because of its critical shortage.
152 N.J. Super. at 589, 378 A.2d at 270.
41 Id. at 587-88, 378 A.2d at 269.
42 The tenants argued that the Act made provisions for this situation via subsection (g)(2).
See note 29 supra. They sought, therefore, protection under that subsection's three month
notice provision, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.2 (c) (West Cum. Supp. 1980-1981), and further
procedures in accordance with the Relocation Assistance Act, N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:31 B-1 to
-12 (Vest Cum. Supp. 1980-1981), as well as relocation benefits as per N.J. STAT. ANN. §§
20:4-1 to -22 (West Cum. Supp. 1980-1981). 152 N.J. Super. at 597, 378 A.2d at 274.
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ing the history of the Act and relevant case law, the court held that
"the statute was not intended to and does not apply to the instant
case where temporary relocation is necessary to perform certain rehabilitation work which is brought about by a HUD-approved project." 43 In reliance on a common sense approach to statutory construction, the opinion viewed "eviction" and "removal" as acts of
permanency, and refused to allow the statute to be interposed as an
impediment to temporary removal. 4 4 This decision thereby departed
from a literal application of the words45 of the Anti-Eviction Actthe Floral Park court had successfully removed tenants without
statutory good cause.
Unlike Floral Park, the lower court in Guttenberg addressed the
applicability of the Anti-Eviction Act to causes of action other than
summary dispossession, 4 6 and held that the Act pertained only to
proceedings brought in the county district court. 4 7 Faced with
somewhat ambiguous language in the statute, the trial judge stated
that "the reference to the Superior Court is intended to apply to
dispossess actions initiated in the county district court and removed
to the Superior Court pursuant to [N.J. STAT. ANN. §1 2A:18-60." 4
In other words, the Anti-Eviction Act was held applicable only where
a landlord sought tenant removal via summary dispossession; it did
not pertain to any other instances where tenant removal was sought.
Thus, according to the chancery court, a foreclosing mortgagee could
have a court order the tenants to vacate.
The appellate division, however, disagreed with the rationale espoused below and held that the Anti-Eviction Act prohibited an\y judicial removal of tenants absent good cause as defined in the Act. 49

Its

discussion of the applicability of the Anti-Eviction Act began and
ended on the same note: foreclosure is not one of the statutorily
enumerated good causes, and therefore judicial removal of these resi
dential tenants was prohibited. 5 0 The court quoted fron Stainbotlos,, 51 the leading authority for the constitutionality of the Act, to
43 152 N.J. Super. at 593, 378 A.2d at 272.
44Id. at 592-97, 378 A.2d at 271-73.
15 The tenants had argued for a literal reading, and therefore good cause to evict did not exist
until there were substantial housing code violations, in accordance with N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:18-61.1(g)(2) (West Cum. Supp. 1980-1981). See note 42 supra.
46 165 N.J. Super. at 202, 397 A.2d at

1127-28.

47 Id. 203, 397 A.2d at 1128.
48 Id.

49 171 N.J. Super. at 423, 409 A.2d at 819.
50 See id. at 421, 409 A.2d at 818 ("[f]oreclosure by a mortgagee is not one of the reasons");

id.at 423, 409 A.2d at 819 ("[floreclosure is not one of the causes").
51 134 N.J. Super. 567, 342 A.2d 529 (App. Div. 1975). For a discussion of this case, see
notes 31-35 supra and accompanying text.
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demonstrate the legislative intent to limit evictions to "reasonable
grounds." Rejecting the chancery court's "judicial creativity through
the application of maxims," 52 the court refused to amend the Act
judicially to include foreclosure as the nineteenth ground for the removal of residential tenants. 5 3 Judge King viewed the mortgagee as
"almost always an 'eyes-open' commercial lender," to whom "the
mortgage is essentially security for payment of debt." 5 4 Citing the
legislature's purpose in enacting the Anti-Eviction Act as the palladium for low and middle income urban tenants, the court read the
statute literally and refused to remove these tenants absent a showing
of the requisite good cause. 55 This literal reading of the statute has
broadened the scope of the Anti-Eviction Act to proceedings other
than summary dispossession. Such a literal reading, however, while
in accordance with societal concern for tenants, is open to question.
Historically, a mortgagee could enforce its rights in courts other
than those with jurisdiction over summary dispossess actions. 5 6 The
52 171 N.J. Super. at 423, 409 A.2d at 819. This comment refers to Judge Kentz' reliance on
the principle that a statute is subject to strict construction when it is contrary to common law
property rights. 165 N.J. Super. at 202, 397 A.2d at 1128. See Floral Park Tenants Ass'n v.
Project Holding, Inc., 152 N.J. Super. 582, 591, 378 A.2d 266, 271 (Ch. Div. 1977), aff'd. sub
nom. Project Holding, Inc. v. Smyth, 166 N.J. Super. 354, 399 A.2d 1033 (App. Div. 1979);
Hill Manor Apts. v. Brome, 164, N.J. Super. 295, 309, 395 A.2d 1307, 1314 (Dist Ct. Essex
Cty. 1978).
5' This judicial reluctance to "legislate" has not been uniformly adhered to. See Bradley v.
Rapp, 132 N.J. Super. 429, 334 A.2d 61 (App. Div. 1975), certif. denied, 68 N.J. 149, 343 A.2d
437 (1975) and Sabato v. Sabato, 135 N.J. Super. 158, 342 A.2d 886 (Law Div. 1975). In those
cases new owners of two-family and three-family homes, respectively, were awarded judgments
of possession against tenants residing therein, absent statutory good cause. While Bradley was a
court-made definition of "owner-occupied premises," the Sabato case was clearly judicial legislation, as was illustrated when a subsequent amendment to the Act codified that court's holding.
See notes 31 & 37 supra. Cf. Floral Park Tenants Ass'n. v. Project Holding, Inc., 152 N.J.
Super. 582, 378 A.2d 266 (Ch. Div. 1977), aff'd. sub nom. Project Holding, Inc. v. Smyth, 166
N.J. Super. 354, 399 A.2d 1033 (App. Div. 1979) (Anti-Eviction Act held inapplicable to temporary relocation of tenants to facilitate renovations even though tenants would be returning to
substantially different premises at higher rents).
171 N.J. Super. at 423, 409 A.2d at 819. The court elaborated further:
To
In *substance, the mortgage is essentially security for payment of debt ....
give a secured creditor a greater right than that of the landlord to evict nonoffending tenants upon the landlord's financial failure would be anomalous and would
seriously thwart the legislative purpose.
Id. (citations omitted).
55 Id. "We cannot conceive that the Legislature intended to allow foreclosing mortgagees to
evict tenants from housing 'in which they have been comfortable and where they have not
caused any problems."' Id. (quoting from N.J. Ass. Bill 1586 (1974) (attached statement)). See
note 11 supra.
56 See generally R. CUNNINGHAM & S. TISCHLER, 29 NEW JERSEY PRACTICE, LAW OF

MORTGAGES § 205 (West 1975). In New Jersey, upon the default of the mortgagor, the
mortgagee is entitled, inter alia, to possession of the mortgaged premises. This right is enforceable by an action for possession, New Jersey's version of the common law ejectment action. N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:35-1 (West 1952). See note 65 infra. Prior to 1979, an action for possession
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legislature, therefore, could not have intended the Anti-Eviction Act
to preclude a mortgagee from enforcing his rights when the Act, by
its terms, is not applicable to all of the courts with jurisdiction over
mortgage litigation. 57 This perception of the legislative intent is
bolstered by the fact that other remedial legislation in the landlordtenant area is applicable specifically to all courts, in any type of proceeding. 58 In Guttenberg, the decision of the lower court turned on
this construction of the Anti-Eviction Act, 5 9 but on appeal the court
took the literal language of the statute somewhat out of context and
applied it to the case at hand without thoroughly contemplating the
precedent being set. The Guttenberg court failed to address fully the
impact of its decision on a mortgagee's rights. A brief discussion of
the relevant mortgage law principles will highlight the pervasive
ramifications of this decision.
A mortgage is viewed today as conveying title to the property, a
lien on the property, or an intermediate/hybrid having characteristics
of both the title and lien theories. Of all the aspects in which these
theories differ, only possession retains importance. 6 0 Title theory
states regard the mortgagee as acquiring a right to possession upon
the execution of the mortgage, subject of course to any contrary
could be brought in two separate courts-the superior court or the county court where the land
was situate. With the abolition of the county court system in 1979, however, an action for
possession may now be maintained only in the superior court, which is constrained by the
literal words of the Anti-Eviction Act. See N.J. Ct. R. 1:1-A. Since the Act specifically limits its
scope to actions in the county district courts and the superior court, can it be said that in

abolishing the county courts the State intended to preclude mortgagees from removing tenants.
via an action for possession, in the exercise of their superior property rights?
57 Indeed, it was not the intent of the draftsmen of the Anti-Eviction Act that it be applicable outside the landlord-tenant relationship. Kenneth E. Meiser, "one of the prime draftsmen of
the Eviction For Cause Act," has made the following assertion:
The Eviction For Cause Law affects only rights between landlords and tenants.
It did not modify the rights of the state to oust a tenant through eminent domain
proceedings or condemnation because the building is unfit for human habitation.
Nor did it affect the right of a mortgagor [sic] to foreclose.
K. MEISER, TENANT-LANDLORD LAW IN NEW JERSEY 73-74, 75 (I.C.L.E. 1978) (footnote omitted).
5' The Landlord-Tenant Reprisal Law, also known as the Retaliatory Eviction Act, N.J.
STAT. ANN. § 2A:42-10. 10 (West Cui.
Supp. 1980-1981), provides that no landlord may serve a
notice to quit or institute any -type of action to recover possession of premises, "whether by
summary dispossess proceedings, civil action for the possession of land, or otherwise" as a reprisal or in retaliation for a tenant's: good faith complaint to a governmental authority for health
or safety violations: attempt to enforce contractual rights: organizing any type of lawful organization; or refusal to comply with substantial lease changes promulgated in retaliation for any of the
aforementioned activities. Id.
59 See notes 8 & 47-48 supra and accompanying text.
6o G. OSBORNE, MORTGAGES § 13 (2d ed. 1970). See R. CUNNINGHAM & S.
TiSCHLER, supra note 56, at § 3;4 AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY §§ 16.14-16.16 at 32-34 (A.J.
Casner ed. 1952).
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agreements. 6 1 Lien theory states, in contrast, never recognize a right
to possession in the mortgagee. 6 2 New Jersey follows the hybrid
theory which synthesizes the two. Until default, the mortgagor is entitled to possession, but upon default the mortgagee may take possession. 63 The mortgagee's right to possession was initially enforceable,
inter alia, through an ejectment action. 6 4 This limited possessory
interest, conferred by the hybrid theory, provides the most effective
65
method of assuring the mortgagor's payment of his debt.
In New Jersey, when a mortgage is recorded all concerned parties are deemed to have legal notice of its contents and thereafter
"take" subject to the mortgagee's interest. 66 In the event of a default
by the mortgagor, the recorded mortgagee has two options. He may
enter into possession and enjoy an estate "with all the incidents of a
common law title,"67 or he may force a judicial sale of the subject
premises in a foreclosure action. 68 Such a sale extinguishes all junior

61
62

This is the original common law view of a mortgage. G. OSBORNE, supra note 61, at § 14.
Id. at § 15.

63 E.g. Dorman v. Fisher, 31 N.J. 13, 155 A.2d 11 (1959); Sears, Roebuck v. Camp, 124
N.J. Eq. 403, 1 A.2d 425 (E. & A. 1938); Kirkebv Corp. v. Cross Bridge Towers, Inc., 91 N.J.
Super. 126, 219 A.2d 343 (Ch. Div. 1966); Vineland Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Felmey, 12 N.J.
Super. 384, 79 A.2d 714 (Ch. Div. 1950); Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. 75 Prospect Coop.
Apartment, 131 N.J. Eq. 387, 25 A.2d 508 (Ch. 1942). See G. OSBORNE, supra note 61, at § 14.
64 As stated in Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. 75 Prospect Coop. Apartment, 131 N.J. Eq. 387,
388-89, 25 A.2d 508, 509 (Ch. 1942):
A mortgagee, upon breach of condition, has a right to the possession of the
mortgaged premises which he can enforce by an action of ejectment. Since the
mortgagee can maintain ejectment, his right of possession runs not only against the
mortgagor but against his grantees, lessees, and all persons whose title is subject to
the mortgage.
Id. (emphasis added).

65 See R. POWELL, THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY
66

454 (rev. ed. 1979).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 46:21-1 (West 1952). This statutory section is part of what is commonly

referred to as the recording acts. See Kirkeby Corp. v. Cross Bridge Towers, Inc., 91 N.J.
Super. 126, 134, 219 A.2d 343, 348 (Ch. Div. 1966) (tenants of mortgagor deemed on notice of
mortgage); Iasillio v. Ackerman, 38 N.J.L.J. 274 (Dist. Ct. Bergen Cty. 1915); G. OSBORNE,
supra note 61, at § 196.
67 Kirkeby Corp. v. Cross Bridge Towers, Inc., 91 N.J. Super. 126, 131, 219 A.2d 343, 346
(Ch. Div. 1966). This right is subject to the mortgagor's equitable right to redemption, wherein

the mortgagee's possession is divested by the mortgagor's satisfaction of the debt. Id. See N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:50-1 to -52 (West 1952 & Cum. Supp. 1980-1981); G. OSBORNE, supra note
61, at

§§

302-10; R. CUNNINGHAM & S. TiSCHLER, supra note 56, at § 181.

See generally N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:50-1 to -52 (West 1952 & Cum. Supp. 1980-1981).
As a result of such a sale, the superior mortgagee has priority, over any subsequent interests in
the property, to the proceeds of this forced judicial sale for the satisfaction of his debt. See note
68

77 infra. It is also worthy of note that:
The purchaser of the mortgaged lands at a foreclosure sale, "'takes the place of the
mortgagee in proceedings in strict foreclosure at common law. His title relates back
to the time of the execution of the mortgage. He succeeds as well to the title and
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encumbrancers' interests in the property.6 9 Thus, whether a tenancy
is viewed as a purchase of an estate or an encumbrance on the landlord's estate, the proper recordation of a mortgage affects a subsequent tenant's right to possession.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the existence of a mortgage is
a relevant consideration in the determination of a tenant's rights. The
Guttenberg decision has, however, altered the rights of a mortgagee
upon default. The court's failure to discuss fully the rights and
liabilities of the mortgagee, the mortgagor, the tenants, and, most
significantly, the purchaser at the foreclosure sale, diminishes the
opinion's persuasiveness.
Guttenberg stands for the proposition that a foreclosing
mortgagee may not remove tenants protected by the Anti-Eviction
Act absent good cause. Because of the court's concern with protecting
tenants who might be "unfairly and arbitrarily ousted from housing
quarters in which they have been comfortable and where they have
not caused any problems," 70 the opinion overlooked a crucial issue
presented on appeal-a mortgagee's rights. As a result of that oversight the heretofore settled property law principles attendant to the
mortgage relationship have been rendered dangerously unsettled. A
logical progression from Guttenberg would create an almost irreconcilable conflict between mortgage law and the Anti-Eviction Act. It is
what the court did not state, rather than what it stated, that gives rise
to this conflict.
First and foremost, Judge King did not hold that these
subsequent-in-time tenants 71 were "subject to" the mortgage. If

estate acquired by the mortgagee by the delivery of the mortgage deed, as to the
estate the mortgagor had at the time of the execution of the mortgage."
Sears, Roebuck v. Camp, 124 N.J. Eq. 403, 410, 1 A,2d 425, 429 (E. & A. 1938) (quoting

Champion v. Hinkle, 45 N.J. Eq. 162, 165, 16 A. 701, 703 (E. & A. 1889)).
'9 Champion v. Hinkle, 45 N.J. Eq. 162, 165, 16 A. 701, 702 (E. & A. 1889). These junior
encumbrancers must be made parties-defendant, or their interests survive the sale. See Koppel

v. Olaf Realty Corp., 62 N.J. Super. 103, 115, 162 A.2d 306, 313 (App. Div. 1960).
7

N.J. Ass. Bill 1586 (1974) (attached statement). See note 11 supra for the full text of the

statement.
71 The trial court noted:
There is no evidence in the record, nor was it argued, that the tenants' interests are
not subordinate to plaintiff's. In any event, such a factor would appear to be an
affirmative defense to be pleaded in the tenants' answering, rather than the basis for
a motion . . ..

165 N.J. Super. at 203 n.1, 397 A.2d at 1128 n.1.
Had the tenancies preceeded the mortgage, the mortgagee would take an inchoate ,possessory interest subject to the leases. The mortgagee would have no right to possession, unless
there was an agreement to subordinate, see Kirkebv Corp. v. Cross Bridge Towers, Inc., 91
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these tenants were subject to the mortgage, then Guttenberg merely
limited a mortgagee's hybrid theory rights upon a mortgagor's default.
So construed, this case has abolished a foreclosing mortgagee's right
to actual possession, but his ability to gain a constructive possession
of the mortgaged premises remains unaffected. 7 2 Alternatively, if the
subsequent-in-time tenants are not subject to the mortgage, the
Anti-Eviction Act, according to Guttenberg, has elevated tenancies
which arise after a mortgage above the priorities scheme of the recording acts. This construction is in complete derogation of the re73
cording act policy that a first-in-time interest in realty has priority.
Second, the opinion specifically stated that it made no determi74
nation regarding the rights of a purchaser at the foreclosure sale.
Since any such ruling would have been dicta, the court was correct in
declining to reach this issue. This omission, however, coupled with
the failure to state specifically that the tenancies were subject to the
mortgage casts some doubt upon what had been settled law. Normally, a tenancy subject to a mortgage terminates upon the sale of
the property at foreclosure. The purchaser's title acquired at the judicial sale relates back in time to the date of the mortgage, and the
property is conveyed free of any tenant's interest. 7 5

By not stating

that the tenants were subject to the mortgage, and not indicating
what rights a purchaser at foreclosure has, the Guttenberg court has
left unanswered the question it created-whether the Anti-Eviction
Act was intended to impair the value of the security given to a
mortgagee for a debt.

N.J. Super. 126, 134, 219 A.2d 343, 348 (Ch. Div. 1966), since month-to-month tenancies are
considered continuing tenancies. Stamboulos v. McKee, 134 N.J. Super. 567, 570, 342 A.2d
529, 530 (App. Div. 1975).
72 In New Jersey, upon a mortgagor's default a mortgagee may take either actual or constructive possession. The former mode involves physical entry upon the premises by the mortgagee.
See R. CUNNINGHAM & S. TISCHLER, supra note 56, at § 195. In the latter, no physical entry is
involved, but there is exercise of "dominion and control" over the premises. Mere rent collection, however, has not been construed to constitute dominion and control. See id.; G. OsBORNE, supra note 61, at § 162. Moreover, an alternative to any sort of possession is a courtappointed rent receiver. "The appointment of a receiver in the foreclosure suit is a substitute
for the ejectment or the taking possession of the property." Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. 75
Prospect Coop. Apartment, 131 N.J. Eq. 387, 389, 25 A.2d 508, 509 (Ch. 1942).
73 See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 46:16-1 to 46:22-4 (West 1940 & Cum. Supp. 1980-1981).
74 171 N.J. Super. at 421, 409 A.2d at 818. See note 68 supra.
75 Ellveeay Newspaper Workers' Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Wagner Market Co., 110 N.J.L.
577, 580, 166 A. 332, 333 (Sup. Ct. 1933), aff'd, 112 N.J.L. 88, 169 A'.692 (E. & A. 1933). The
lease is not terminated, however, where the tenant is not made a party-defendant to the foreclosure action. Id. at 580, 166 A. at 333. See Walgreen v. Moore, 116 N.J. Eq. 348, 173 A. 587
(Ch. 1934); Guardian Life Ins. Co. v. Lowenthal, 13 N.J. Misc. 849, 181 A. 897 (Sup. Ct.
1935).
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Where mortgaged property is sold at a foreclosure sale there are
two possible results. 76 Where the property is sold for at least the
outstanding amount of the note or bond, the proceeds go to the foreclosing mortgagee with any excess distributed in accordance with the
priority scheme. 7 7 Where the sale results in a deficiency, 7 8 however,
the mortgagee is forced to seek recourse from the mortgagor personally. 7 9 Problems may arise, though, if tenants whose leaseholds
commenced subsequent to the mortgage are allowed to remain in
possession after the foreclosure sale, 8 0 possibly decreasing the value
of the property, and relegating the mortgagee to a deficiency judgment. Such prejudice to the mortgagee would result if the AntiEviction Act were held to be applicable to a purchaser at the foreclosure sale. The Act would thereby impair the security given for the
debt.

76 These results are, of course, exclusive of the possibility of settlement.

77 For purposes of this analysis, an abbreviated explanation will suffice. In actual practice
the proceeds from the foreclose sale are distributed- in the following fashion:
[F]irst, . . . to the costs of the selling officer for sale of the property . . . ; secondly,

to the taxed costs of the plaintiff, or any prevailing mortgagee or party; then to the
satisfaction of the mortgage debt of such party; and lastly, to the taxed costs of the
subordinate encumbrancers and their debt in the order of priority as fixed in the
judgment and execution.
R. CUNNINGHAM & S..TISCHLER, supra note 56, at § 381 n.I.
78 A deficiency judgment is "[t]hat part of a debt secured by mortgage not realized from sale
of mortgaged premises.'" BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 379 (5th ed. 1979).
79 Prior to the recent amendment to N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:50-2 (West Cum. Supp. 19801981), the holder of a note secured by a mortgage could proceed either against the individual
personally or against the property for satisfaction of the debt, while the holder of a bond and
mortgage was forced to foreclose on the property before any action could be commenced against
the individual debtor. The recent amendment, however, has changed this "option" of the
noteholder. Now any proceeding to collect a debt secured by a mortgage must begin with
foreclosure. Id.
80 A different result would be arrived at if the Act were interpreted to be applicable only in
summary dispossess actions-the view espoused by Judge Kentz. See notes 47-48 supra and
accompanying text. It may also be argued that the statute's ban on tenant removal is inapplicable to the purchaser at foreclosure, as the title given by the sheriff is free of all subsequent
encumbrances. Thus all tenancies are extinguished. See note 68 supra. With the tenancies terminated in this fashion, a court could issue a writ of possession in favor of the purchaser. One
authority notes:
It is an obvious principle that, absent a power conferred by statute or express
grant or reservation, a grantor cannot convey an estate which is greater or will
endure for a longer period than his own. So if a lessor whose estate is one for life or
is otherwise limited or conditioned makes a lease for a term which has not expired
when the lessor's estate ends, the lessee's estate nevertheless terminates. Likewise,
where the lessor's estate is subject to a prior mortgage or other lien, the lessee's
estate is terminated by sale on foreclosure where he is made a party to the proceedings.

I AMERICAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 3.101 (A.J. Casner, ed. 1952) (footnotes omitted).
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The resolution of this conflict between the Anti-Eviction Act policy and the first-in-time, first-in-right policy underlying the recording
acts and mortgage law should be left to the legislature, which is in
the best position to resolve it. Nevertheless, an analogy may be
drawn to the mortgage law concept of marshalling in an effort to illustrate the possibility of a foreclosure sale which would respect both
policies.
Marshalling is a principle of equity wherein the immediate burden of debt satisfaction at foreclosure is directed solely at the interest
of the mortgagor, and only upon the depletion of his resources is a
foreclosing mortgagee permitted to extinguish the interests of subsequent purchasers or junior encumbrancers. Equity seeks, through
marshalling, to protect parties with an interest in property subject to

a superior mortgage. The principle mandates that subordinate interests shall be extinguished via foreclosure only where the senior
mortgagee will otherwise be prejudiced. 8 1 One particular marshalling concept, the two funds doctrine, 82 presents a reasonable solution
to the conflicting interests of the mortgagee and the tenants protected
83
by the Anti-Eviction Act.

The two finds doctrine is utilized where the mortgagor owns two
separate parcels of property, with both subject to a first mortgage,

and one subject to a second mortgage, lien, or other encumbrance.
This doctrine requires that upon the mortgagor's default the first
81 C. OSBORNE, supra note 61, at § 286; R. CUNNINGHAM & S. TISCHLER, supra note 56,
at § 335.
82 E.g., Sternberger v. Sussman, 69 N.J. Eq. 199, 60 A. 195 (Ch. 1905), aff'd, 85 N.J. Eq.
593, 98 A. 1087 (E. & A. 1916).

83 In addition to the two funds doctrine, marshalling includes another distinct principlethe inverse order of alienation rule. This rule is invoked when a common grantor who has
mortgaged property sells off parcels of the tract subject to a mortgage on the whole. The rule
holds that upon foreclosure, the debt will be first satisfied from any property remaining with the
mortgagor, and then from the parcels sold subject to the mortgage, in the inverse order of those
sales. E.g., Ocean County Nat'l Bank v. J. Edwin Ellor & Sons, 116 N.J. Eq. 287, 173 A. 138

(Ch. 1934). The "inverse order" element requires that the mortgagee, after exhausting this
recourse against property held by the mortgagor, must proceed against property alienated by
such mortgagor in reverse chronological order of such alienation. In this manner the mortgagor
is initially held accountable for his default, after which his subsequent purchasers are. For a
discussion of this rule see G. OSBORNE, supra note 61, at § 287.
The inverse order of alienation rule might also provide a solution to this conflict between
the Anti-Eviction Act and the mortgagee's rights. If the leasehold is viewed as a parcel of the
entire estate, in essence a temporal parcel, which is sold to a subsequent purchaser (here, the
tenant who acquires the apartment subsequent to the mortgage), this rule presents a valid
analogy. The common grantor would be the mortgagor-landlord, whose property-both the
reversionary interest in the apartments and the right to rents-would initially be sold. Where
this sale did not produce enough money to satisfy the debt, the tenants could be removed in
the inverse order of the commencement of their tenancies until the sale of the property satisfied
the debt.
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mortgagee proceed initially against the property subject solely to his
mortgage. Only when that sale is insufficient to satisfy the debt may
the senior mortgagee proceed against the property encumbered by
84
both his mortgage and a junior interest.
In order to utilize the rationale of the two funds doctrine in a
Guttenberg-type situation, the mortgaged premises must be viewed
as two distinct properties to be bid on at the foreclosure sale, one
with the tenants remaining in possession and one with the tenants
removed. If the tenancies are viewed as a quasi-lien on the premises, 85 the mortgagee should first proceed against the premises with
the tenants remaining in possession in an attempt to satisfy the debt.
Only when the debt would not be satisfied from this sale might the
premises be sold free of the leaseholds, thereby extinguishing the
junior quasi-lienor's interest. 86
As noted earlier, the Anti-Eviction Act and the recording acts
cannot be reconciled in those instances where the foreclosure sale
fails to satisfy the debt because the tenants are allowed to remain in
possession. There remains the societal concern about a statewide critical housing shortage, as evidenced by an act designed to lend a degree of predictability to the rental market. In contrast to that concern
is the hallmark of all real estate titles-the recording system. Usually
the policies underlying these concerns are quite distinct. If the
policies are viewed as parallel lines, the Guttenberg decision has deflected the Anti-Eviction Act line so that it intersects the recording
acts' line at the point where the property with the tenants in possession fails to satisfy the debt. When the lines intersect, either the
tenants must be removed or the prior-in-time mortgagee must be
deemed subsequent in right.
It may be helpful to demonstrate factually this ultimate policy
confrontation. The mortgage in Guttenberg, for example, secured a
debt of $30,000. If the property could be sold at the foreclosure sale
for at least this amount with the tenants remaining in possession, a
strong policy argument could be advanced that the tenants not be
removed absent good cause. The mortgagee would recover the
amount due him via foreclosure. However, if the property could be
sold vacant for an amount in excess of the debt, say $35,000, but with
the tenants remaining it could not be sold for the amount of the debt,
say $25,000, a confrontation between the policies would arise. Hence,

84 G. OSBORNE, supra note 61, at § 286.
15 See text accompanying note 84 supra.

86 Such sale should only occur if the sale of the vacant premises would command a bid high
enough to discharge the indebtedness.
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with the tenants remaining in possession the mortgagee would be left
with a deficiency of $5,000, a now unsecured obligation of the
mortgagor. Such a result would mean that the tenants were not subject to the mortgage. These subsequent purchasers of an interest in a
mortgaged premises would then be elevated above the recorded interest of the mortgagee, and the policy behind the recording acts
would be rendered meaningless.
The possibility of a deficiency judgment at the foreclosure sale
logically appears to be the point where one policy must yield. If the
debt secured by the mortgage is satisfied by the judicial sale of the
premises without the tenants being removed, there appears to be no
need for removal. If, however, there would be a deficiency judgment
with the tenants remaining in possession, but there would be no deficiency with the premises sold vacant, a strong argument may be
made for removal. This result would give as much deference as possible to the Anti-Eviction Act without infringing on the rights of a secured creditor, i.e., the mortgagee. A solution to the mechanics of
such a judicial sale would probably necessitate legislative action, but
the aforementioned principles of marshalling might serve as models
for such a procedure.
There are obviously problems attendant upon these suggestions. 8 7 On a practical level, the uncertainty of the tenants' rights
during the period from default until the foreclosure sale leaves the
tenants in an ambiguous situation until it is determined whether
there will be a deficiency. Where the tenants are required to vacate
after the sale, the time they will be allowed to remain on the premises while seeking another residence during this period of a critical
housing shortage requires resolution. The relatively long notice provisions of the Anti-Eviction Act 8 8 suggest one response, but are by no
means a definitive answer. Such problems will certainly arise, and
their disposition will require a careful legislative analysis of societal
interests.
The theories offered by this note are advanced to illustrate an
equitable method of rendering compatible the policies behind the
Anti-Eviction Act, landlord-tenant law, the recording acts, and

87 A difficult problem might be the procedure to be followed at the foreclosure sale. The
possibility of two or more types of bids on the premises could easily lead to confusion and
uncertainty for all involved. Moreover, the mortgagor's statutory right of redemption after the
foreclosure sale further complicates matters, since N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:50-4 (West 1952 &
Cum. Supp. 1980-1981) provides the mortgagor with a six-month period after the foreclosure
sale within which he may recover the property by payment of the debt.
"8 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:18-61.2 (West Cum. Supp. 1980-1981). See note 29 supra.
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mortgage law. These analyses, however, rest on the premise that
where the policies irreconcilably conflict, the secured interest of the
mortgagee will override the tenants' interest in non-removal from the
leasehold absent good cause. This conclusion has not been drawn by
the New Jersey courts or legislature to date. Indeed, the issue has
yet to be considered. Until such a determination is reached, Guttenberg and its progeny will serve as food for thought.
Harold N. Hensel

